Omnipresent and Omnipotent Authoritarianism:
Authoritarian Media vs. Social Media?
Ulaş Başar Gezgin
Abstract
This chapter reviews the empirical works on authoritarianism and discusses
the distinctions between mainstream media (MM) and social media with regard to
the major communication theories, models and approaches. For that purpose,
political psychological research on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) which
consists of 3 dimensions (authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression
and conventionalism) is reviewed. In the previous research, RWA is found to be
associated with a set of variables such as support for war, military
intervention, attitudes toward violence, prejudice, age and cohort, endorsement
of traditional gender roles, sexually aggressive beliefs etc. The presentation
of the links between authoritarianism and intergroup relationships is followed
by the discussion of RWA and social dominance orientation (SDO). The former
refers to submissive authoritarians (masses), while the latter corresponds to
dominating authoritarians (leaders). Previous research shows that
authoritarians follow the norms set by authorities; and when the norms are not
clear, they resort to other sources. For them, the world is a dangerous place,
full of threats. Thus, authoritarianism appears as a response to feelings of
threat. The critique of the individualism in early and recent authoritarianism
studies leads the researchers to develop the notion of group authoritarianism
which fares better with the complementary position of RWA and SDO. A
contribution of this line of research is the emphasis on interactivity of
authoritarian dispositions, feelings of threat, in-group identification and
social context. Just like group authoritarianism, SDO provides a framework on
the basis of groups. Not pathologizing the subject, SDO researchers investigate
beliefs on social hierarchy and egalitarianism. The next discussion involves
the notion of left-wing authoritarianism. Together, these provide the
background for elaborating on authoritarianism, media and social media. The
chapter ends with future research ideas.
Keywords: Political Psychology, Authoritarianism, Right-wing
authoritarianism, the Mainstream Media, and Social Media.
1. Introduction
How is authoritarianism related with mainstream media (MM) and social
media? What does the relevant literature say about the likely relationships?
What might be the potential applications of the communication theories, models
and approaches to this discussion? This chapter intends to provide preliminary
responses for these questions. In one way or another, authoritarianism is
everywhere. This omnipresent and omnipotent authoritarianism reproduces itself
in authoritarian institutions such as family, schools, peers and role models,
media, military, politics, religion, work etc. The next sections of this
chapter reviews current political psychological research on authoritarianism,
excluding non-psychological studies on authoritarian governments;
authoritarianism and intergroup relations; Right-Wing Authoritarianism and
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO); Right-Wing Authoritarianism and the left;
and omnipresence of authoritarianism. The penultimate section contrasts media
and social media and discusses them in terms of authoritarianism. The final
section concludes with recommendations for future research.
2. Current Political Psychology
Research on Authoritarianism
Due to methodological and theoretical problems with Adorno’s seminal work
on authoritarian personality, political psychological studies on authoritarianism
long evolved into different lines of research. The strongest and most studied
among them is Altemeyer’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). In a nutshell,
Altemeyer (2003) describes RWA by the following:
““High “RWAs” are authoritarian
followers who have submissive attitudes toward established authorities, show a
general aggressiveness toward persons “targeted” by those authorities, and
adhere tightly to social conventions”” (p.161).
In other words, RWA has 3 dimensions:
“[P]eople with high scores on authoritarianism
value behavioral and attitudinal conformity (conventionalism), emphasize
obedience to group authorities (submission), and are intolerant and punitive
towards people who do not conform to ingroup norms and rules (aggression)” (Passini, 2008, p.52).
These lines could be summarized by the following scale item:
“The only way our country can get
through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some
tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas”
(Altemeyer, 2003, p.161).
Altemeyer (2003) portrays the right-wing authoritarians by the following
profile:
“High RWAs have proven to be
relatively submissive to government injustices, unsupportive of civil liberties
and the Bill of Rights, supportive of the Experimenter in the Milgram
situation, high shockers themselves in a “punish the learner” situation,
punitive toward lawbreakers, mean-spirited, ready to join government “posses”
to run down almost everyone (including themselves), happy with traditional sex
roles, strongly influenced by group norms, highly religious (especially in a
fundamentalist way), and politically conservative (from the grass roots up to
the pros, say studies of over 1,500 elected lawmakers). They also have
remarkably compartmentalized minds, endorse a multitude of contradictory
beliefs, apply a variety of double standards to their thinking on social
matters, are blind to themselves, dogmatic, fearful of a dangerous world, and
self-righteous to beat the band. (...)
Right-wing authoritarians are also
relatively prejudiced—against just about any racial, ethnic, or nationalistic
minority you can think of, and against homosexuals, women, Francophones (in
Canada), atheists, and other religious people who happen to belong to different
faiths” (Altemeyer, 2003, p.161-162).
RWA is associated with greater support of war and military intervention
(Motyl, Hart & Pyszczynski, 2010, p.200). Benjamin (2006) finds that three
out of four subscales of Attitudes Toward Violence Scale (war (e.g., “Killing of civilians should be accepted as
an unavoidable part of war”), penal code violence (e.g., “Any prisoner deserves to be mistreated by
other prisoners in jail.”), and corporal punishment (e.g., “Children should be spanked for temper
tantrums.”)) correlate with RWA. A significant factor in this association
is infrahumanization whereby out-group contrasted with the humane in-group
members are considered to be creatures that are not human (Motyl, Hart &
Pyszczynski, 2010, p.201). Hodson, Hogg & MacInnis (2009) depicts how
personality variables such as (low) openness to experience predict RWA and are
associated with prejudice and social dominance orientation. In Johnson, Rowatt,
Barnard-Brak, Patock-Peckham, LaBouff & Carlisle (2011)’s study, RWA stands
out as the mediator for the relationship between religiosity and racial
prejudice. To be more specific, they find that aggression dimension of RWA is
the mediator for the relationship between religious fundamentalism and
prejudice toward Arabs and African Americans. In the same vein, Riemann,
Grubich, Hempel, Mergl & Richter (1993) finds that conservatism is
negatively correlated with openness to new experiences, extraversion and
agreeableness, and positively with conscientiousness.
The common sense view about age and authoritarianism indicates a positive
relationship, while Tilley (2005) observes no relationship between social
ageing factors (such as marriage and having children) and authoritarianism at
all. Instead, he proposes that the libertarian-authoritarian value change in
Britain can be attributed to generational (cohort) differences. In other words,
people don’t get more authoritarian as they age, but the new generation is less
authoritarian than the youth years of the present old generation. That this is
based on a longitudinal study covering the period between 1974 and 2001 is an
asset, while use of an authoritarian scale other than Altemeyer’s is a deficit.
In Tilley (2005)’s study, the authoritarianism-libertarianism axis is measured
by the following items in addition to some other items on surveys:
“i. Young people today don’t have
enough respect for traditional British values.
ii. Censorship of films and magazines
is necessary to uphold moral standards.
iii. People in Britain should be more
tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives.
iv. Homosexual relations are always
wrong.
v. People should be allowed to
organize public meetings to protest against the government.
vi. Even political parties which wish
to overthrow democracy should not be banned” (Tilley, 2005, p.443).
Rubinstein & Lansisky (2013) studies “authoritarianism and gender roles of Israeli footballers,
basketballers, non-athletes, and their wives” and observes that football
players and their wives are more authoritarian (in the sense of RWA) compared
to basketball players and their wives. They also differ in correlations with
anti-feminist attitudes, masculine roles, religiosity and support for the
political right. They conclude that football involves a right-wing authoritarian
subculture. Likewise, RWA is found to be related with sexually aggressive
beliefs and behaviors along with sex role traditionalism and male dominance
factors (Walker, Rowe & Quinsey, 1993, p.1036).
RWA has developmental dimensions, with social learning serving as a more
explanatory model compared to earlier psychoanalytical ones (Altemeyer, 2004,
p.90). Intergenerational transmission of racism is found to be associated with
adolescent-parent concordance in RWA (Duriez & Soenens, 2009). Furthermore,
Mayseless, Miri Scharf & Sholt (2003) discusses whether authoritarian
parenting is advantageous for adolescents in authoritarian social environments
(e.g. the case of basic training in the 3-year mandatory military service in
Israel); and finds that this is not the case: Adolescents of authoritative
(democratic) parents in contrast to authoritarian parents are better at coping
strategies in authoritarian environments.
3. Authoritarianism And Intergroup
Relations
Miklikowska (2012)’s research focuses on support of democratic values which
is measured by a 10-item ‘scale of democratic values’ that consists of
statements such as “Because
demonstrations frequently become disorderly and disruptive, radical and
extremist political groups shouldn’t be allowed to demonstrate” and “This country would be better off if we
worried less about how equal people are” and concludes that interpersonal
trust, (low) normative identity style (which refers to scale items such as “I prefer to deal with situations where I can
rely on social norms and standards”), and empathy are good predictors of
democratic values; while empathy and (low) authoritarianism are the strongest
predictors. RWA and normative identity style are negatively correlated. As both
RWA and empathy develop at an early age, the topic has developmental dimensions
to be investigated in future studies (Miklikowska, 2012, p.606). Consistent
with this notion of normative identity style, Oyamot, Fisher, Deason &
Borgida (2012) finds in an experimental study that authoritarians revamp their
attitudes towards immigrants as a response to the changes in social norms. When
tolerance is set as the social norm, they are more tolerant; whereas when the
social norm is negative or ambiguous, they are less tolerant (excluding the differences
in humanitarianism). However, Oyamot et al. (2012) is not totally comparable
with other relevant studies, as they used ‘child-rearing’ values rather than
RWA scale to measure authoritarianism. They state that the psychometric
problems of RWA scale are behind their decision. However, child-rearing values
and (other) political values do not always overlap with each other. That is why
the study could be considered as inconclusive until a new study that would
utilize RWA scale would be conducted.
Butler (2009) studies fears of authoritarians (as measured by RWA) and
discovers that they don’t differ from non-authoritarians in terms of fears and
perceived threats except fear of and perceived threat from socially deviant
behaviors. This notion of perceived threat can be distinguished from actual
threat, as threats do not influence all people in authoritarian ways, but those
with authoritarian predispositions only (Stellmacher & Petzel, 2005,
p.260). In another direction, Stellmacher & Petzel (2005) tries to connect
research on authoritarianism with inter-group relations theories such as social
identity theory and self-categorization theory and develops a group
authoritarianism scale. They list 3 problems with early authoritarianism
research: The unit of analysis is individual only, excluding groups. Secondly,
the influence of social context was not totally integrated in authoritarianism
research. Thirdly, authoritarianism overlaps with some other phenomena such as
conservatism. They define
“group authoritarianism (GA) as an
individual belief about the appropriate relationship that should exist between
groups and their individual members. We assume—as mentioned earlier—that group
authoritarianism is a one-dimensional concept with two extremes (authoritarianism
vs. autonomy). It is assumed that group authoritarianism is influenced by
authoritarian dispositions and situational factors. Thus, group
authoritarianism reflects the situation-specific activation of authoritarian
beliefs” (Stellmacher & Petzel, 2005, p.248).
Following Altemeyer’s RWA scale, GA scale consists of 3 dimensions:
Conventionalism (e.g. “A group member
should do nothing that contradicts group-norms or rules.”), aggression
(e.g. “A group member who has violated
group rules should be punished severely”) and submission (e.g. “If a group has a leader, members have to
respect and obey him in any case”). GA scale has 2 versions. The items
above are from the general version. In the specific versions, a group is
explicitly stated (e.g. a nation, students etc.).
By an experimental design, Stellmacher & Petzel (2005) demonstrates
that group authoritarianism can be induced by threat and in-group
identification salience which assumes that it is situation-specific. However,
it can be induced in people with prior authoritarian predispositions only, as
stated above. Thus authoritarian behavior is an interaction of authoritarian
predispositions and social context. In that sense, Stellmacher & Petzel
(2005) relates the general version of GA with a trait variable, while the
specific versions with a state variable. They claim that an advantage of GA
scale over RWA scale is that the former is relatively free of political
confounds. GA can explain authoritarianism among both rightists and leftists.
This point assumes that LWA exists contrary to Altemeyer’s positions.
Stellmacher & Petzel (2005) further states that group membership provides
psychological and social security that authoritarians are in need of.
4. Right-Wing Authoritarianism And
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)
Altemeyer (2003) proposes that high RWAs submit to social dominators (in
other words, people high on social dominance orientation (SDO)). Social
dominators are “relatively power hungry,
domineering, mean, Machiavellian and amoral, and hold “conservative” economic
and political
outlooks” (Altemeyer, 2003, p.163). RWA and SDO together account
most of the variation in prejudice. High SDOs turn out to be authoritarian
leaders and high RWAs are their followers. People high on both are the most
prejudiced. It is proposed that Hitler was one of these double-highs
(Altemeyer, 2003, p.164). In a simulation game, Altemeyer (2003) demonstrates
how double-highs could lead the world to a bleak future, in contrast to
high-RWA-only people and double-lows. Although this is just a simulation, the
implications could point to the danger of double-highs ‘leading’ the world
(Altemeyer, 2003, p.164).
SDO is conceptualized as a normal behavior in contrast to early
authoritarianism research that had pathologized the topic. Again, unlike the
psychodynamic assumptions of early research, SDO research considers SDO as a
result of both temperament and socialization.
Finally, SDO is based on a group model, while authoritarianism research
relies on an individualistic unit of analysis (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth
& Malle, 1994, p.751). Duriez & Soenens (2009), in their study of
racism, RWA and SDO suggests that socialization agents other than the family
such as peers, school teachers and media should be considered.
Duriez & Van Hiel (2002) finds that RWA, SDO and racism are correlated;
however, RWA and SDO differ in a set of variables. They observe a negative
association between authoritarianism and “level
of education, moral competence, relativism, and the values hedonism,
stimulation and self-direction”; a positive association between
authoritarianism and “age, cultural
conservatism, orthodoxy, and the values tradition, conformity and security”.
Contrary to this, SDO is found to be negatively associated with “age and the values universalism, benevolence
and tradition”; and positively associated with “economic conservatism, external critique, and the values power,
achievement, hedonism and stimulation” (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002,
p.1199). Although findings on RWA is mostly in the expected direction, those on
SDO needs further explanation, but this won’t be explored further, as it falls
out of the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, the following quotation would
give an idea about the overall picture:
“The modern fascist is no longer a
closed-minded bigot, but an intellectual, who is perfectly able to express
his/her world-views in such a way that they not only sound acceptable, but also
attractive to the general public” (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002, p.1210).
In a meta-analysis of RWA and prejudice, Childs (2011) finds out a decrease
in the correlation between RWA and racial/ethnic prejudice between 1948 and
2008; and an increase in that between RWA and anti-gay prejudice between 1969
and 2008. The link between SDO and racial prejudice is constant, while the
correlation between SDO and anti-gay prejudice was found to decrease between
1995 and 2009. These may be attributed to the changes in social norms and the
influence of social movements. However, this can’t explain the finding on RWA
and anti-gay prejudice. Childs (2011) states that this may be due to the
possibility that high RWAs and SDOs feel threatened by the recent gay rights
movements and bolster their anti-gay prejudices. The short span of SDO is mentioned as a
limitation of the study.
According to Passini (2008)’s findings, SDO is associated with only one
dimension of RWA which is authoritarian aggression (in other words,
‘intolerance of deviance’). Passini (2008) criticizes Altemeyer’s one-dimensional
measurement of RWA, although 3 dimensions were theoretically proposed. To
overcome this problem, he develops a 3-dimensional scale of RWA. Passini (2008)
also points out the difficulty of inferring a personality type from RWA which
is more like an attitude measure.
Authoritarian aggression is found to be associated with all dimensions
of moral exclusion which consists of components such as labeling (e.g. “Honestly, I have to admit that we are
superior to this group.”), feelings of threat (e.g. “I think that this group is a real threat to our well-being.”),
destructive ideologies (e.g. the reverse of “I think that the members of this group deserve respect in any case.”
and explicit attack (e.g. “I think that
we have to fight this group by all means.”) (Passini, 2008, p.59). Passini
(2008)’s study clearly shows that authoritarian aggression which involves
intolerance is distinctive compared to authoritarian submission which does not
always involve intolerance. The latter matches blind following, while the
former corresponds to negative attitudes against outgroups. Furthermore,
authoritarian aggression is found to be associated with materialistic values
which insists on personal achievement rather than equality and not necessarily
associated with traditions and religion (Passini, 2008, p.58). Religious people
support adherence to conventions, but they are not always in favor of harsh
treatment of outgroups. It should be noted that Passini (2008)’s study was
implemented in Italy. Converging with Passini (2008), Altemeyer (2004) states
that SDOs are low on religion and self-proclaimed benevolence compared to RWAs.
SDOs endorse hedonism, but not conformity nor tradition, as opposed to RWAs.
SDOs are usually male, while RWA are of both sexes (Altemeyer, 2004, p.92).
These differences can be due to Altemeyer’s one-dimensional measurement of RWA
and the generalized wording of SDO scale (i.e. not naming any social group).
Despite of the common sense view that the link between authoritarianism and
political ideology revolves on a naive understanding of politics, Federico,
Fisher & Deason (2011) observes a more sophisticated understanding
underlying this link. Politically more conscious authoritarians (‘experts’) are
different compared to the less conscious ones (Political consciousness is
measured by responses to political knowledge questions). This discussion can
clearly be connected to SDO. However, the main weakness of Federico, Fisher
& Deason (2011) is their reliance on National Election Survey data which
covers indirect measures of RWA such as child-rearing practices. On the other
hand, they consider use of these rather than RWA as an asset, since they don’t
cover explicitly political items. Nevertheless, that they can’t collect
separate data on 3 dimensions of RWA is clearly a deficit.
5. Right-Wing Authoritarianism and The
Left
Contrary to the position that authoritarianism is a right-wing phenomenon,
Regt, Mortelmans & Smits (2011) studies the topic in ex-socialist countries
and concludes that left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) is a reality and not a myth
in Eastern European countries. The findings are mooted, since the notion of
left in ex-socialist and socialist countries are different compared to
capitalist ones, and since there may be major differences in the
conceptualization of left in ex-socialist countries rather than actual
socialist ones. Furthermore, some of the countries they covered were engaged in
bloody civil wars (e.g. Yugoslavia) which would make the post-war understanding
of left problematic. The findings could also reflect the disillusionment with
the ‘Western’ democracy. Finally, the use of a measure other than Altemeyer’s
RWA is another obstacle against comparison. On the other hand, McFarland,
Ageyev, & Abalakina-Paap (1992)’s study in the Soviet Union just before the
collapse and right after the collapse points to the possibility that
authoritarianism is a predictor of “support
for reactionary leaders and military actions and opposition to democratic and
non Russian leaders and to democratic activities” and the finding that
authoritarianism and support for Marxist-Leninist ideology are correlated with
each other (McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina-Paap, 1992, p.1004). A
longitudinal design to check what happened to those participants in terms of
authoritarianism in the upcoming years would be interesting. In the same vein,
McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina-Paap (1992)’s findings conflict with
Altemeyer’s results that could not identify LWA among leftists in the ‘West’.
The more egalitarian and non-conventional nature of the left in capitalist
societies could be behind this, as mentioned by McFarland, Ageyev, &
Abalakina-Paap (1992) themselves. Whether socialism is the norm or not
determines conventionalism and non-conventionalism of LWA which is central to
this construct (McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina-Paap, 1992, p.1006).
McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina-Paap (1992) administered 30-item version
of Altemeyer’s RWA scale by adapting 5 items to the Soviet setting. E.g. the
item “People should pay less attention to
the Bible...” was replaced by the item “People
should pay less attention to the Marxism-Leninism...”. “Support for the
authorities and opposition to the enemies” were found to be common among
American and Soviet authoritarians (McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina-Paap,
1992). Secondly, they found strong correlation between authoritarianism and “Soviet ethnocentrism and its component
prejudices (toward Jews, national groups, women, dissidents, etc.)”
(McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina-Paap, 1992, p.1005). The differentiation
between Soviet socialists and ‘Western’ socialists could overlap with the
critique of official leftists and state leftists. Furthermore, if RWA items
would be considered one by one, it is quite unlikely for a leftist to score
high on these, as they are direct opposites of leftist values. If leftism would
be taken at face value or nominally, the analysis would be misleading. The
reconceptualization of authoritarianism as merely the opposite of democratic
values serves the ideological function of turning inherent authoritarianism of
the capitalist democracies invisible, much in resemblance with Althusser’s and
Gramsci’s positions. As stated before, Altemeyer (2004) fails to find leftists
scoring high on even the LWA Scale which clearly demarcates leftists and
rightists.
6. Omnipresence of Authoritarianism
As stated in the introduction, authoritarianism is omnipresent in the
social institutions. The most commonly studied institutions with regard to
authoritarianism are schools, family and work. In this section, two relevant
works are reviewed, before moving to the sections about media and social
media.
In an early paper on authoritarianism (which was published before the
emergence of the notion of RWA), Athanasiou (1968) states that authoritarianism
is usually associated with “intolerance
of ambiguity, categorical thinking, responsiveness to the demands of authority,
and anti-intraception” (p.1181). He proposes that engineering curriculum is
implicitly in favor of authoritarianism, as ambiguity is not tolerated with
structured programs and questions, hours reserved for humanity courses are
limited, the teaching style is impersonal and students’ free time for social
activities is scarce.
Secondly, in a leadership study from a managerial perspective, Rajan &
Krishnan (2002) observes a positive correlation between authoritarianism and
assertiveness, bargaining, friendliness and legitimate power; and a negative
correlation between authoritarianism and coercive power for men.
Authoritarianism and friendliness correlates negatively for women, while expert
power is positively correlated for both men and women. Adding to the
complicated nature of the corporate setting, it can be stated that the
authoritarianism at work might be quite different from RWA, as violence is
rarely condoned at work settings. Furthermore, cultural factors should be taken
into consideration, as the study was conducted in India. If social norms are
dramatically influential over authoritarians as proposed by Oyamot et al.
(2012), we have a strong reason to put cultural factors under limelight.
Finally, Rajan & Krishnan (2002) measures authoritarianism with Adorno’s
F-Scale which is no longer common in the relevant studies.
One problem to be observed when authoritarianism is studied in
institutional settings is the difficulty in applicability of RWA rather than
authoritarianism in general. However, this is not a problem in studies of
authoritarianism of media and social media, as media is inherently ideological.
7. Authoritarianism and Media vs.
Social Media
Considering the 3 dimensions of RWA again (cf. Altemeyer, 2003), it can be
stated that the mainstream media (MM) is a by-product and promoter of
conformity; it is submissive to the government and the
industrial-military-financial complex; and often negatively represent and even
target outgroup members. In some countries, MM is controlled by direct
intervention by government and corporations via explicit instructions that are
hidden from public eyes or by indirect intervention by the threat of financial
losses (taxes, ads etc.). MM is a channel which obeys the powers as lambs and
turns into a tiger, when it comes to outgroups. The authoritarianism of media
can be observed at other levels as well: Firstly, the media employees are
expected to obey (cf. Rajan & Krishnan (2002) above); secondly, more time
and space are dedicated for RWAs on media portrayals; thirdly, RWAs and professions
associated with authoritarian powers are shown in positive light; fourthly,
university education and in-service training for media professionals are mostly
authoritarian (cf. Athanasiou (1968) above) and finally, it is rare to see that
RWAs are punished for the violence channeled against outgroups. Of course, in
real life, they are rarely punished; but the portrayal of their punishment is
even rarer than the case in real life. Furthermore, MM prefers to hide or
minimize news on rights movements demanding fairness.
Following, Altemeyer (2003)’s profile for RWA, it can be stated that the
government and oppressors in general are often right on MM; prejudices,
dehumanization and infrahumanization are rampant and the law and order
framework which depicts the world out there as a dangerous place full of
threats (in parallel with the widespread screening of the horror movies) is the
staple of MM (cf. Butler, 2009; Stellmacher & Petzel, 2005). If the victim
is an outgroup member, blaming the victim is the norm with the just world
hypothesis. Contrary to these, the genders are not always in traditional roles;
and religion is not ubiquitous except in fundamentalist media. MM is frequently
pro-war and militaristic. Depictions of violence on MM normalize aggression.
MM, as an authoritarian socializer seeps into even pre-school materials,
cartoons and teen movies. It is a major channel for the intergenerational
transmission of authoritarianism and other political values (cf. Duriez &
Soenens, 2009). Following Miklikowska (2012) and Oyamot et al. (2012), MM sets
the norms for authoritarians, when other sources of social norms don’t send
clear messages.
From the perspective of Social Dominance Orientation, MM is guilty again.
MM features worlds in which egalitarianism is either an exception or a utopia.
Social norm violators are usually shown to be fiercely punished.
Liberal-looking youngsters are attacked by monsters, wild animals, serial
killers etc. in the prime-time movies of MM channels. Furthermore, MM reflects
social institutions that promote authoritarianism and social dominance (family,
schools, peers and role models, military, politics, religion, work etc.) in
their most conventional outlook. In fact, when their norms are violated, that
makes surprise news or action movie as in the case of crimes and protests.
Are RWA and SDO of media reflected in social media? As stated in Gezgin
(2012a), media and social media can be compared and contrasted by the following
points: Interactivity, user-generated content, synchronicity, anonymity, impact
on user identity, credibility/genuineness, media-real life connection,
personalization, and celebrity patterns among many others. The notion of
interactivity challenges a form of authoritarianism that is specific to mass
media: The social media user is no longer a passive recipient of contents;
instead, s/he is the generator. Synchronicity does not allow the censor to
block the content. It can only take place afterwards. Anonymity frees some of
the users from the authoritarian norms. Social media strengthened the doubts
cast over the credibility of the MM. Far from an escape, it served as an
extension of the real life for many users, whereby they not only modify their
attitudes, but move to action. It has a strong impact on the user identity,
which means it has the potential to act as an alternative socializer. As to
personalization, social media provides the opportunity for users to develop
their own identities which challenges standardization imposed by
authoritarianism. Furthermore, social media users question celebrity patterns
which contradict egalitarianism in a society. On the other hand, contrary to
this rosy view, many negative papers appeared on journals (e.g. Pearce &
Kendzior, 2012); however, these studies seldom investigate authoritarianism in
the political psychological sense. Thus, studies connecting political
psychological notion of authoritarianism and social media are necessary.
On the top of all, theoretical works on social media are rare. That is why
this effort for comparing and contrasting media and social media with regard to
authoritarianism is obviously not comprehensive. However, if we turn our
attention to the communication theories, models and approaches used to analyze
and explain mass communication for this comparison, the following could be
listed as a set of preliminary considerations:
The Early Mechanistic Media Effects
Models: The early mechanistic media effects
models which started with the 2nd World War- styled propaganda models that assumes
blind obedience once exposed to media has long been defunct for mass
communication (Yüksel, 2013, p.21). It is even less relevant for social media.
People do not obey social media and in fact, social media does not demand their
obedience.
The Late Media Effects Models: Late media effects models such as spiral of silence
(Noelle-Neumann, 1974) and agenda setting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) are
definitely relevant for media. As stated before, MM sets the norms and this
determines viewers’ intellectual latitude of safety. Secondly, MM is still a
major tool for oppressors to set their own artificial agendas. As to social
media, it is clear that oppressors can not completely intimidate netizens to
accept the official views on social media spaces and they are rarely successful
to set the social media agenda which can be measured and evaluated based on
hashtags and top viewed contents. However, the oppressors have equipped
themselves with internet laws and censorship to put pressure on individual,
collective and institutional content generators (cf. Kelly, Truong, Earp, Reed,
Shahbaz & Greco-Stoner, 2014; Reporters Without Borders, 2013).
Cultivation Theory: Thirdly, cultivation theory (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan,
& Signorielli, 1986) which is a return to strong effect models but on long
term is definitely relevant for MM, as it involves long-term effects of the
stereotypical portrayals of outgroups on MM. On the other hand, it is difficult
to identify Gerbnerian effects of social media without longitudinal studies. Without
such studies, we can only speculate that Gerbnerian effects could be partially
observed over the users; but these effects would be weaker compared to those of
MM. It is weaker, because the social media users mostly decide on which
contents to be exposed to. But this opens up the possibility that such use of
social media may lead to bolstering of a user’s attitudes in the way of
self-confirmation. So it is likely that social media users are exposed to
various content effects which spring from the channels that they choose by
their own. Of course, this channel choice may not necessarily be rational or
individualistic. There are emotional and group effects over social media
decisions. Another dimension of this issue refers to the blended and/or hybrid
nature of the social media contents. Because of the popularity of the social
media, MM has also been ‘socialized’, in the sense that MM has social media
presence, commentary spaces on their websites and videos specifically prepared
for social media world. That means in some of the cases, the distinction
between MM and social media contents is blurred. Furthermore, Twitter (and
Facebook at a narrower scope) is increasingly used as a source of news for MM,
as it is used by politicians and celebrities as public diaries and announcement
boards (Gezgin, 2013a; 2013b). In that sense, it is possible that
authoritarianism of MM seeps into social media that is supposed to serve as
alternative media.
The Audience-Centered Approaches: The audience-centered approaches are the ones that
focus on what people do with the media, rather than what media do to people
(Ruggerio, 2000). Although this active audience assumption is questioned for
mass communication due to its potential engagement with conservatism and
neo-liberalism (Erdoğan & Alemdar, 2010, p.158); it can be stated that it
is applicable for social media uses. According to these models, the audience
actively chooses the media and media contents. Under this functionalist
framework, media use serves the needs of escape/entertainment, social utility,
personal identity and surveillence (Gezgin, 2012b). This list of needs has been
explored in Facebook research (Bonds-Raacke & Raacke, 2010; Park, Kee &
Valenzuela, 2009; Raacke & Bonds-Raacke, 2010; Urista, Dong & Day, 2009).
Without any personality discussion, such an understanding may conclude that
individual is the agent to make his/her decisions over social media use.
However, considering the RWA and SDO literature reviewed above, the users are
definitely far from making their own decisions. People low or high on RWA and
SDO would pick different social media contents and use social media in
different ways, as exemplified by the way pro-government users utilize social
media in contrast to anti-government users (e.g. Bianet, 2011; Büyükkaya,
2013). Windahl’s uses and effects model can be integrated to this point, as the
model proposes that the audience chooses the media and media contents and get
exposed to the effects of them accordingly. In other words, both effect models
and active audience assumption are reconciled in this model (Ruggiero, 2000).
Likewise, Rubin & Windahl’s uses and dependency model which is another
attempt at reconciliation (cf. Rubin & Windahl, 1986) can be considered for
discussion. DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach’s dependency model can be relevant as
well. Finally, Palmgreen & Rayburn’s and McQuail ve Windahl’s expectancy
value model could be applied for the comparison of MM and social media, since
this model focuses on the repeated uses of media. It differs from the other
models, as it incorporates personal history of use and gratification into the
analysis whereby media use that gratified the needs in the past are more
prefered in the future (Palmgreen & Rayburn, 1982). Although it looks like
behaviorism from the backdoor, its focus on repeated uses is more realistic
than cross-sectional one-time-only approaches. This model also supports the
above claim that high RWA and/or SDO people differ from low RWA and/or SDO
people in their social media use.
The Technology-Centered Approaches: The technology-centered approaches usually rely on a
version of technological determinism which is also their weakest point. By
these approaches, for instance, 2011 Arab uprisings are considered to be the
result of the social media age; in other words, it is claimed that they would
not take place without social media (Huang, 2011; Reardon, 2012). The
alternative is the social media as the facilitator rather than the determining
factor (Dewey, Kaden, Marks, Matsushima & Zhu, 2012; Lever, 2013;
O’Donnell, 2011) which looks like more realistic, as the social dynamics of
uprisings such as the economic, political and social breaking points and power
differentials existed before the advent of social media and it will continue to
exist as long as capitalism reigns supreme. Such technological determinism
theses also ignore the fact that uprisings did not start with social media;
since the Spartacan revolt and even before that, the history of humankind
recorded rebellions and power takeovers spanning all the world temporo-geography
including ancient Mesopotamian city-states as well ancient Chinese societies.
Thus social media has the potential to challenge authorities and
authoritarianism(s), but it is not the initiator of social movements.
These approaches may take the form of psychological/perceptual determinism
as in the case of Marshal McLuhan (McLean, 1998) or social determinism as in
the cases of Harold Innis and Lerner (cf. Babe, 2008; Servaes, 2002). These are
usually criticized by the fact that they ignore social aspects of media use
(Croteau, Hoynes & Milan, 2011, pp.289-290). Another form is the focus on
diffusion of innovation (e.g. Rogers, 1983) or Vernon’s product life cycle
framework (Morrison, 2008). Although such models are readily applicable to the
spread of social media use, their links with authoritarianism needs another
chapter-long review and discussion. Likewise, ‘information age’ theorists such
as Daniel Bell, Brzezinski, Castells and Masuda are centrally relevant for the
discussion of media and social media (cf. Rahman, 2009), but it is not clear
how RWA and SDO could be articulated with direct links to the notion of
highly-criticized ‘information age’ or ‘information society’.
The Linguistic/Semiological
Approaches: The linguistic/semiological
approaches can be roughly divided by structuralist vs. post-structuralist
types. In general, they differ in whether the texts are considered to be
reflections of social structures or the audience actively constructs the
meaning, a lot in parallel with uses and gratifications approaches (cf. Biocca,
1988). After the pioneering work of Saussure in linguistics, Levi Strauss
extended the semiological approaches by applying Saussurian ideas to the field
of anthropology in his search for cultural universals (Stasch, 2006). While
Peirce is recognized with his contribution to early Saussurian ideas, Jakobson
is listed as a major figure in structuralism with analyses of communication in
general and literary and non-literary text in particular (cf. Deledalle, 2000).
Early Barthes was a structuralist in his analyses of modern myths following the
footsteps of Levi Strauss, while the late Barthes is one of the first to offer
post-structuralist analysis with his notions of readerly text and writerly text
(Allen, 2003). Barthes’ seminal work was followed by Stuart Hall, Morley,
Baudrillard and feminist researchers such as Ang, Radway & Hobson (cf.
During, 1999; Turner, 2003). Hall’s notion of multiple readings (dominant
reading, negotiated reading and oppositional reading) and use of Kristeva’s
notion of intertextuality, Morley’s applied studies in this direction, feminist
studies, Baudrillard’s simulation, simulacra and hyper-reality were the
milestones in post-structuralist research (cf. During, 1999; Turner, 2003). The
structuralist and post-structuralist concepts have rarely been discussed with
regard to the distinction between media and social media. However, we can
propose that structuralist view would consider social media as the venue where
popular myths (including authoritarian ones) are produced, transmitted and
reproduced; while post-structuralist approaches would re-instate the power of
the social media users to challenge the dominant readings of texts. Before all,
authoritarianism and hate speech as its reflection can find a safe haven in
racist, fascist and discriminating websites and social media. Thus, despite its
emancipatory potentials, social media use is not always progressive. In that
sense, the notion of legitimizing myths that are central to the SDO model (cf.
Pratto et al., 1994) could be blended with structuralist point of view to
analyze the breeding and reproduction of discriminatory practices on social
media.
The Critical Approaches: The critical approaches revolve on the critique of MM
and society in general (cf. Taylor & Harris, 2008). They are roughly
classified as political economical approaches and cultural approaches. The
political economic approaches usually challenge the mainstream neo-liberal
economic approaches and focus on ownership structures of the media markets and
companies. The topic of the links of media bosses with the government,
capitalists and military complex; and
monopolization (e.g. Bagdikian, 1983) is one of the major themes via such an
approach. The scholarly works on how social media bosses are linked with the
authoritarian oppressors are quite rare, although news on how and why
governments ask social media companies to pass data about some users sometimes
appear on newspapers (e.g. McWeigh, 2013).
Moving to the second type of the critical approaches which focus on
cultural issues, Frankfurt School is the first school that comes to mind. The
notion of cultural industry was based on the idea that cultural products
including media products were produced and distributed massively as any other
industrial product in the mass communication era (Strinati, 2004). Although
this critique is reasonable and fruitful, its underlying pessimism was
criticized, as it gives no chance to people to resist against the system (cf.
Arato & Gebhardt, 1985). A Frankfurter approach would consider mass
communication as a factory of obedience, but how this could be broadened to
cover social media is a moot. With less pessimism and more complicated
analyses, Herbert Schiller’s notion of cultural imperialism, Armand Mattelart’s
critical approach and Oliver
Boyd-Barrett’s notion of media imperialism could be relevant for discussions of
MM and social media with regard to authoritarianism (cf. Mosco, 2008); but this
is another understudied subject. Obviously, the cultural imperialism approach
can be utilized to analyze how the advent of social media in non-American and
especially non-Anglophone contexts lead to lexical borrowings which already
have vernacular substitutes (e.g. ‘like’, ‘hashtag’, ‘trending topic’, ‘follow’
etc.) and to analyze the implicit internalization of American cultural elements
that appear to be a part of the global social media culture. Finally,
Enzensberger’s ‘consciousness industry’ (Enzensberger, 1974) and Herman &
Chomsky’s notions of ‘media and propaganda model’ and ‘manufacturing consent’
(Herman & Chomsky, 1988) could be useful to analyze and criticize MM, but
how they may take account of social media is far from clear.
To conclude this section, we can state that although theoretical approaches
and models provide significant insights to discuss MM and social media in
relation with authoritarianism, even seminal works are still lacking.
Nevertheless, this section listed the major concepts that could be applicable
to the central topics of this work.
8. Conclusion and Recommendations
The relevant literature review evidences the dearth of research on RWA, SDO
and social media. Ditto for the communication theories, models and approaches
on the one hand, and social media on the other. Nevertheless, at first blush,
the notions of spiral of silence, agenda setting, cultivation, uses and
gratifications and their variants such as uses and effects models, ‘information
age’, multiple readings, intertextuality, readerly and writerly texts and
cultural imperialism that are mentioned in the penultimate section appears to
be readily applicable for social media.
The following could be the
recommendations for future research:
- Assuming that social media forms a more egalitarian platform, social
media usage patterns could be associated with RWA and SDO. It may be likely
that those low on RWA and SDO would prefer to use social media, rather than
being exposed to the mass media.
- It is likely that social media usage patterns of low vs. high RWAs and
SDOs would be different as well as content they share. Content analysis of the
posts could be fruitful.
- The conceptualization of anti-authoritarianism and egalitarianism as the
polar opposites of RWA and SDO could be problematic, as they were derived from
the authoritarian and dominant personalities respectively. Disobedience rather
than obedience might be the central research topic to understand how dissidents
can appear in a society despite of the authoritarian and hierarchical social
institutions.
- Usually, printed media is analyzed for authoritarian contents. The
development of TV search engines (e.g. http://tvarsivi.com/) allows content
analysis of TV programs as well. Thus, RWA and SDO of TV channels can be
analyzed in terms of news coverage and especially prime-time films and
programs.
- Following the notion of group authoritarianism, how MM builds in-group
identity (e.g. nationalism and ummahism), and how it awakens a feeling of
threat (e.g. crime news, horror movies etc.) can be analyzed.
- The negative socialization function of MM could be studied on the basis
of age groups.
In this chapter, relevant research on authoritarianism and social dominance
orientation are reviewed to briefly analyze mainstream media and social media
with regard to political psychology. This was followed by a discussion of
communication theories, models and approaches as applied to social media with
regard to authoritarianism. This work is just a background-setter for the
future studies.
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Source: Gezgin, U.B. (2017). Connecting Social Science Research with Human Communication Practices: Politics, Education and Psychology of Social Media, Media and Culture.
CONNECTING
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH WITH HUMAN COMMUNICATION PRACTICES: POLITICS,
EDUCATION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL MEDIA, MEDIA AND CULTURE
Prof.Dr. Ulaş
Başar Gezgin
SOCIAL MEDIA,
MEDIA AND POLITICS
1. Omnipresent
and Omnipotent Authoritarianism: Authoritarian Media vs. Social Media?
2. Istanbul
Mobil’ized: Mobile Phones’ Contribution to Political Participation and
Activism in Istanbul Gezi Park Protests and Onwards.
3. The Gezi
Park Protest and #resistgezi: A Chronicle of Tweeting the Protests.
4. Peace
Journalism: Urgently and Desperately Needed in Post-Election Turkey.
SOCIAL MEDIA
AND EDUCATION
5. Critical Thinking
Skills on Social Media: A Blooming Season Or A Period Of Decline?
6. Social
media, blended learning and constructivism: A jigsaw completed by the uses
and gratifications theory?
7. Educational
uses of social media and problem-based learning.
PSYCHOLOGY,
MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA
8. The future
of the new media: The mobile generation and interpersonal communication.
9. “Keep in
E-Touch”: Personality and Facebook use (with Ng)
10. Of Kate
Moss & Marilyn Monroe: Body Dissatisfaction and its Relation to Media
(with Dev)
CULTURAL AND
INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION
11. Media
psychology and intercultural communication: The social representations of
Vietnam on Turkish newspapers.
12. Regional
Journalism in Southeast Asia and ASEAN Identity in Making: Asia News Network
as a Case for International and Intercultural Communication.
13. Uses of
social media to promote ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community in Vietnam.
Bio
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