The Embodied Cognition View
Ulaş Başar Gezgin
The emergence of body in relation to cognition as an area of interest does
not coincide with the emergence of cognitive sciences. It would not be false to
claim that body was neglected in the early stages of the history of cognitive
sciences (Hirose, 2002). This asynchrony has been due to the Cartesian legacy
of dualism for cognitive sciences (Anderson, 2003; Garbarini, & Adenzato,
2004; Mingers, 2001; Seitz, 2000). In Piagetian thought, which can be
considered to be one of the early precursors of cognitive sciences,
sensorimotor stage which by and large involves the bodily movements has not
been considered as unique; it was merely one of the stages that is primitive
and prior to higher levels of cognition (i.e. concrete and abstract operational
thought) (Seitz, 2000).
From a philosophical point of view, Mingers (2001) claimed that the history
of cognitive sciences consisted of three stages:
“The first stage of “pure”
consciousness or thought exemplies the disembodied Cartesianism of Husserl. The
second stage focuses attention on our practical, engaged activity in the world,
drawing on the (early) work of Heidegger. The third stage, that is only just
developing, recognizes the inherently embodied nature of cognition based in
part on the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty” (Mingers, 2001, p. 104).
In the first stage, the Cartesian doubt leads the individual thinker to
take introspection and its station, ‘mind’ as the secure foundation of all
cognitive activities. It was claimed that the senses could be fallible, but the
inner thoughts could not. Therefore, the computational paradigm that is
dominant in the first stage was based on four principles that resemble
Cartesianism:
“separation between mind and body,
that thinking consists of manipulating abstract representations; that these
manipulations can be expressed in a formal language; and that this is
deterministic enough to be embodied in a machine” (Mingers, 2001, pp.
106-107).
Anderson (2003) which provides a field guide for studies on embodied
cognition outlines the first stage in similar lines and adds that this
Cartesianism and the consequent cognitivism appeared in the history of
artificial intelligence as GOFAI (good old-fashioned artificial intelligence).
GOFAI’s basic thrust was that human intelligence could be simulated by machines
in terms of computer programs and mind could be studied and simulated
independent of body and brain.
In the second stage initiated by Dreyfus (1972), the notions of
self-consciousness and intentionality on the one hand, and the continuity of
cognitive activities along with other spheres of human life on the other were
emphasized. A long quotation from Mingers (2001) provides a comprehensive
outline of the second stage:
“The main outlines are first, that
cognition and thought is not an isolated, separate mental function but our
normal everyday activity – our “being-in-the-world”. It is embodied in the
patterns of behavior which are triggered by our interactions and which have
developed through our structural coupling
(Maturana & Varela, 1987). “Thinking” is not detached reflection but part
of our basic attitude to the world – one of continual purposeful action.
Second, knowledge does not consist of representations, in individuals’ heads,
of objective independent entities. Rather, we make distinctions through our
language in the course of our interactions with others, continually structuring
and restructuring the world as we co-ordinate our purposeful activities. Third,
that which is said does not occur de novo, but is grounded in our past
experiences and tradition – the history of our structural couplings.
Fourth, the most important dimension
of our actions as humans is language but we must change our view of language
away from seeing it as representational and denotative towards seeing it as
(social) action through which we co-ordinate our activity. Languaging takes place in
conversations which become the central unit of analysis. Such conversations are
networks of distinctions, requests and commitments, valid in respect of their
acceptance by others rather than their correspondence to an external reality.
Finally, the view of “problems” which computers can help “solve” must change.
Problems are not objective features of the world, but the result of breakdowns
within our structural coupling to objects or to others. When our activities do
not succeed or our co-ordinations fail, our routine operation is disrupted and
a “problem” occurs. This is always against a particular background, for a
particular individual or group and the nature of the problem only becomes
defined through the attempts to repair it” (Mingers, 2001, pp. 110-111).
By 1990s, an embodied understanding of cognition has risen. The research on
the topic is still rare. There is no consensus on the objections of the
advocates of the embodied cognition view, but an important number of scholars
endorse similar objections against the former approaches in cognitive sciences
(Ziemke, 2002). In the general outline, the embodied cognition view poses that
the body is not accidental for human cognition (Gezgin, 2005). Most of the
cognitive capabilities such as grammar are rooted in the body in the
interactive sense. For example, Johnson (1987) and Lakoff, & Johnson (1999)
trace the origin of grammar in bodily metaphors and Lakoff, & Nuñez (1997)
claim that body is central to mathematical understanding since the metaphors
behind the mathematical systems are based on bodily existence.
Another point posed by the embodied cognition position was the continuity
of human beings as a species with higher levels of the evolutionary ladder.
Likewise, the embodied cognition view considers human beings not as static
beings but dynamic beings evolving and developing on the phylogenetic as well
as ontogenetic lines. Furthermore, the embodied cognition position gives
special emphasis to the implicit aspects of human cognition and claims that
former approaches in cognitive sciences conferred an undue emphasis on explicit
representation (Anderson, 2003, p. 126).
The embodied cognition view has been considered to be the third revolution
in the history of cognitive sciences after the cognitive revolution of 1960s
against behaviorism and the connectionist revolution of 1980s against symbolic
approaches. It caused a reconceptualization of the notion of representations
since representations are the core of cognitive sciences that was heavily
influenced by Cartesian disembodiment (Markman, & Dietrich, 2000).
Cognitive sciences prototypically consider motor systems as peripheral since it
is thought that cognitive system applies over the motor system. In other words,
cognitive system activates (or passifies in that sense) motor system which is a
biological slave. Internal models are formed merely by the exposure to external
entities and events (Keijzer, 2002). Likewise, historically, cognitive science
was based on the assumption that cognition can be studied without regard to
somatosensory system (Markman, & Dietrich, 2000). Embodied cognition view
has questioned this view of superiority of cognitive systems over motor systems
prevalent in cognitive sciences (Keijzer, 2002).
One of the two approaches within embodied cognition research, though in its
infancy yet, completely rejects the notion of representation while the second
approach suggests a revision in the notion of representation by heterogenizing
the notion, in other words, by defining different levels and types of
representation (Markman, & Dietrich, 2000). The first view intends to
replace the notion of representation in cognitive sciences with self-organizing
systems in biology such as genes. The self-organizing systems do not form
representations (Keijzer, 2002).
The implications of the embodied cognition view for artificial intelligence
studies are consistent with NFAI (new fangled artificial intelligence):
Robotics are emphasized in contrast to developing computer programs (Hallam,
& Malcolm, 1994); the study of genetic algorithms and cellular automata has
emerged, and finally genes and neurons as the new metaphors for understanding
and modeling human beings have been employed.
Of course, the embodied cognition view is not immune to criticisms. The
most powerful criticism involves the cognitive differences or similarities of
physically disabled individuals. If cognition is embodied, the objection
continues, in the sense of being grounded in the body, then certain cognitive
difficulties and inabilities would be observed in physically disabled
individuals. This objection has hitherto not tested empirically. It needs
empirical studies to decide (Anderson, 2003, p. 114).
References
Anderson, M. L. (2003). Embodied cognition: a field guide. Artificial
Intelligence, 149, 91-130.
Dreyfus, H. (1972). What computers can’t do: a critique of artificial reason.
New York: Harper & Row.
Garbarini, & Adenzato, (2004). At the root of embodied cognition:
cognitive science meets neurophysiology. Brain and Cognition, 56, 100-106.
Gezgin, U. B. (2005). Bilişsel bilimler ya da yanıtlı-yanıtsız sorular
demeti: insan, bilgisayar ve zeki davranış. Bilim ve Gelecek, 15, 6-11.
Hallam, J. C. T., & Malcolm, C. A. (1994). Behavior: perception, action
and intelligence – the view from situated robotics. Philosophical Transactions:
Physical Sciences and Engineering, 349(1689), 29-42.
Hirose, N. (2002). An ecological approach to embodiment and cognition.
Cognitive Systems Research, 3, 289-299.
Johnson, M. (1987). The body in the mind. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Keijzer, F. (2002). Representation in dynamical and embodied cognition.
Cognitive Systems Research, 3, 275-288.
Lakoff, & Nuñez (1997). The metaphorical structure of mathematics:
sketching out cognitive foundations for a mind-based mathematics. In L. D.
English (Ed.). Mathematical reasoning: analogies, metaphors, and images (pp.
2-89). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied
mind and its challenge to Western thought. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Markman, A. B., & Dietrich, E. (2000). Extending the classical view of
representation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(12), 470-475.
Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition: the
realization of the living. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Mingers, J. (2001). Embodying information systems: the contribution of
phenomenology. Information and Organization, 11, 103-128.
Seitz, J. A. (2000). The bodily basis of thought. New Ideas in Psychology,
18, 23-40.
Source: Gezgin, U. B. (2017). Cognition and Art: Essays on Cognitive Science and Art Narratives.
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COGNITION AND
ART: ESSAYS ON COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND ART NARRATIVES
Prof.Dr.
Ulaş Başar Gezgin
COGNITIVE
SCIENCE
1.
The Embodied Cognition View
2.
On Flanagan’s Ideas On Dreams and Ahead: An Attempt To Locate Dreaming
Phenomenon Under The Superclass Of Consciousness
3.
“The Pragmatics of Cartoons: The Interaction of Bystander Humorosity vs.
Agent-Patient Humorosity.”
4.
Integrationist School or on ‘Rethinking Language’.
5.
On Steven Pinker’s ‘Language Instinct’ or Some Remarks on Evolutionary
Psycholinguistics
6.
On the (Im)Possibility of Psychotherapist Computer Programs: An Investigation
within the Realm of Epistemology
7.
Thai Language: A Brief Typology.
ART NARRATIVES
8.
Armenians As Ingroups in William Saroyan’s Stories from the Framework of the
Theory of Social Representations: A Social Psychological Inquiry.
9.
A Critique of The Stories By South East Asian Writing Awardees
10.
Mulholland Drive: Another impasse for the American film industry.
11.
On 'About Schmidt'
12.
On Black spirituals.
13.
The possibility of an African American poetry.
Bio
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