The Pragmatics of Cartoons:
The Interaction of Bystander
Humorosity vs. Agent-Patient Humorosity
Ulaş Başar Gezgin
Abstract
The pragmatic analysis of cartoons poses numerous difficulties for
theoretical pragmatics as well as applied areas. There have been theoretical,
pragmatic and experimental studies to uncover the quality of humors, but there
is neither a theory specifically designed to account for the source and degree
of humorosity in cartoons nor a general theory applicable to the domain of
cartoons. Yet three models are prevalent in humor research: the first model
(the script-based semantic theory of humor; SSTH) addresses what makes a text
humorous and a cognitivistic account mobilizing the notion of scripts and
script opposition. The second model (Setup, Incongruity, Resolution; SIR) which
dovetails with the former and the third one concerns the stages involved in
humor comprehension: three stages are proposed. Finally the third model (the
general theory of verbal humor; GTVH) addresses the issue of what makes a text
humorous again in a seemingly comprehensive way though it fails to account the
nature of cartoons since it is a theory of verbal humors only and since
cartoons are not necessarily based on verbal humors to be humorous. In this
study, Piyale Madra’s cartoon band ‘Ademler ve Havvalar’ is taken to be cases
to investigate. The cartoons that had been published on the newspaper ‘Radikal’
are selected for closer scrutiny. Based on the bits and pieces of these
cartoons, a general overview of a theory of cartoons is presented though such a
theory needs cross-validation transcending the idiosyncrasies of a single
cartoonist. That is, in order to construct a theory, further studies are
necessary in which cartoons by cartoonists of extremely different mentalities
are necessary. This is one of the major limitations of this study.
1. Humor and the Models for Humor
Ambiguity is inherent in language but most of the time it is avoided by
rules of disambiguation or cues accruing from the context. But there are
certain areas in which ambiguation is the norm (Vaid et al. 2003, p.1431).
Accordingly, the major areas in which the ambiguation principle operates are
jokes and cartoons. It has been proposed that the funniness of jokes comes from
at least two internally consistent but externally incongruent understanding.
Raskin (1998) has a prominent place in academic circles investigating humor
since he has provided a cognitivistic account of humor by applying the schema
theory to humorous cases (Norrick, 2003, p.1334). Quoting from his former
works, he presents the script-based semantic theory of humor (SSTH). According
to SSTH, a text is funny if and only if two conditions are met:
(1)
The text is compatible fully or in
part, with two distinct scripts.
(2)
The two distinct scripts are opposite in a
special predefined sense.
Raskin (1998) provides another contribution by classifying people into two:
People with sense of humor and those without it. The former “switches easily and readily from the
bona-fide mode of communication to the joke-telling mode, have more scripts
available for oppositeness interaction, and have more oppositeness relations
between scripts relations” while the latter “refuses to switch from the bona-fide mode of communication to the
joke-telling mode, have fewer scripts available for oppositeness interaction”,
and finally “have fewer oppositeness
relations between scripts available” (Raskin, 1998, p.97).
A third point by Raskin (1998) is that there are four aspects of the sense
of humor. The cognitive aspect refers to the ability of the person to operate
scripts and identify oppositions. It is claimed that all people has this
ability unless they have language disorders. The communicative aspect refers to
level of familiarity of the person to different modes of communication
(factual, jocular, oratory, phatic etc.). The experiential aspect refers to the
experiences of the person associated with the scripts and oppositions. These three
aspects constitute the sense of humor which can be considered to be a single
module while the final aspect (the volitional aspect) refers to the decision by
the person to activate or not to activate the sense of humor module for a given
situation. For example suppose that a cartoon that stigmatizes homosexuals is
considered. A person against such a stigmatization would understand the punch
line but s/he would not laugh and even not find it funny. On the other hand,
another person who is not sensitive to such stigmatization instances would find
the cartoon funny and laugh.
A fourth contribution of Raskin (1998) is theoretical. He claims that
Grice’s cooperative principle with four maxims is an idealization and bona-fide (BD) skewed. That is, Gricean
framework presupposes that “the speaker
is absolutely and unexceptionally committed to the truth of what is being said”
(Raskin, 1998, p.99). This BD skewness is only observed in technical manuals.
Even very serious speech is interrupted by jokes, fictional anecdotes so and so
forth. Humorous texts are in NBD (non-bona-fide)
mode. NBD mode is cooperative while the four maxims are subordinated to a
single principle: the principle of humor. Everything is mobilized to make the
narrative funny.
A fifth contribution of Raskin (1998) is the notion of cooperativeness
scale despite of its flaws and incompleteness. Table 1 presents current
author’s reclassification. A criticism of Raskin’s conceptualization is due.
Table 1. The interaction of mode of
communication and cooperativeness.
|
|
Cooperativeness
|
|
|
|
Positive
|
Negative
|
Mode of communication
|
Bona-Fide
|
Factual
|
Schizoid (?)
|
Non-Bona-Fide
|
Humorous/ Fictional
|
Lying
|
According to Raskin (1998) both factual and humorous texts are cooperative
and bona-fide. It is hard to
understand why he classifies humorous texts under the bona-fide category after
his proposal that “[p]art of the SSTH is
a postulation of joke-telling as a non-bona-fide mode of communication (NBF),
i.e., a mode in which the speaker is not committed to the truth of what is
being said and the hearer is aware of this non-commitment” (Raskin, 1998,
p.99). Probably Raskin (1998) had a hidden agenda that can not be inferable
from his work alone.
According to Table 1, when the mode of communication is non-bona-fide and
the speech-actor is cooperative, the text is humorous. This is also
questionable in the sense that almost all fictional texts share this property.
The conceptualization behind Table 1 does not suffice on its own to distinguish
humorous and non-humorous fiction.
As to the third category, when the mode of communication is non-bona-fide
and the speech-actor is noncooperative, the person is lying (p.99). This seems
to be a reasonable account of lying by Raskin (1998).
Albeit that Raskin (1998) has not worked on the fourth cell that is the
logical possibility, one may infer that in the fourth case, the speech-actor
may be schizophrenic. The mode of communication is bona-fide but the
speech-actor is not cooperative. It should be reminded that Table 1 is an
idealization and bidirectional moves between BF and NBF frequently occur in
real life. Lies are always accompanied with BF components to make the text
reasonable and veritable. Likewise an author can move from cooperative to
noncooperative mode when s/he delves into the depth of a topic with a
complicated syntax and less familiar expressions (Raskin, 1998, p.100).
What is interesting and not pronounced in the relevant literature is that
the funniness is out of the joke or cartoon. It is not an agent-patient
funniness but a bystander funniness. As the cases will illustrate, the event
depicted is not funny for the characters of the narratives. It is the whole
system when considered from outside which is laughed at. Though this point seems
to qualify both jokes and cartoons, cartoons can be manipulated to have a
different property: The punchline may either implicate or explicate humor. In
the first case, less thought will be involved. The receiver will just get the
message and laugh. However, for cartoons, the range of events is ample. They do
not always make the receiver laugh. Additionally, the proposal that “there
exists both laughter without humor and humor without laughter” (Attardo, 2003,
p.1288) complicates the issue further.
Leaving aside the system
humorosity for some time, let us consider the possibility of humorosity in a
dialogical text. When the humorous and non-humorous fictional texts are
considered, there are four possibilities. Those possibilities are depicted in
Table 2.
Table 2. Four possibilities of
humorosity in a dialogical text.
|
|
According to the SPEAKER, it is
|
|
|
|
FUNNY
|
NOT FUNNY
|
According to the HEARER, it is
|
FUNNY
|
Humorous
|
Fictional but accepted
|
NOT FUNNY
|
Humorous but refuted (unsuccessful
humor? Insult?)
|
Fictional
|
A dialogical text will be humorous from within the system if and only if it
is funny both for the hearer and the speaker. If it is not funny from the
speaker’s point of view, it should be considered to be fictional given that the
mode is NBF. But it may be funny according to the hearer. Such a situation
might emerge when the dialogical text has multiple meanings that are funny, yet
overlooked by the speaker. The third possibility is that it is funny for the
speaker but considered to be otherwise for the hearer. Maybe it is an attempt
to narrate a funny thing but it fails because it is not so much sophisticated
or it does not fit the scripts of the hearer. In that sense, the failure may be
due to the cognitive aspect or the communicative aspect. Furthermore, another
possibility is that the text may be interpreted as an insult or stigmatization
like the case of homosexuality pronounced above. In such cases, the
incongruence between the speaker’s and the hearer’s interpretations may be due
to the volitional aspect. If the hearer would consider the text as an insult,
s/he would avoid laughing.
Besides Raskin’s
framework, another cognitively oriented account encountered in the literature
posits that there are three stages (Setup, Incongruity, Resolution; SIR in
brief) in joke comprehension. An initial setup phase triggering a schema is
followed by the phase of incongruity discovery in which some aspects of the
initial schema is violated. This second stage is alternately followed by the
resolution phase in which this violation is resolved by the invocation of a
higher level of schema (Vaid, 2003, p.1432).
This model seems to be directly implementable by computational
techniques. It reduces joke comprehension to a matter of symbolic manipulation
not unlike any kind of problem solving. Thus there are two possibilities to
test this three-stage model: The first would involve a computational approach.
By employing PROLOG, a computer program may be developed and system’s
efficiency might be the triangulation point to weigh the explanatory power of
the model. If the program does not exhibit high degrees of Type I error (i.e.
mistaking a text as humorous whereas it is not) and Type II error (i.e.
mistaking a text as fiction or factual text whereas it is humorous), it would
be conducive to understanding the properties of humor.
In effect, this
understanding of humor has paved the way for the emergence of the area of
computational humor. Ritchie (2001) provides an elaborate review of this new
area. He replies the critiques who object to the computational study of humor
due to the cultural variability of humorosity, by making an analogy between
humors and language. According to him, that languages have different dialects
do not prevent us from developing a theory of language. The cultural
variability is not a reason for abandoning the computational study of humor but
shows that a possible computational theory of humor should address rather
complex challenges than it would seem at first blush.
The second possibility is empirical. Cases of jokes can be considered to
see to what extent this model explains the humorosity of the cases. This
methodology will be endorsed in this paper when the cartoons are taken under
investigation.
The most recent theory for humor is the general theory of verbal humor
(GTVH) based on Raskin’s earlier work. According to GTVH, humorous texts are
shaped by 6 Knowledge Resources (KRs):
“1. Script Opposition (SO)
2. Logical Mechanism (LM): the way in
which the two scripts are brought
together.
3. Situation (SI): objects,
participants, activities, etc. i.e. the context.
4. Narrative Strategy (NS): narrative
organisation of the text, including
adjacency pairs and figures of speech.
5. Target (TA): the ‘‘butt’’ of a
joke.
6. Language (LA): information
necessary for the verbalisation of the text.”
(Antonopoulou, & Sifianou, 2003, p.745).
Despite of the halo
created by its proponents, GTVH is far from a comprehensive account
of humor. It “relies on scripts
attached to words, and says nothing of facial expressions, gestures, props,
imitations of voices and noises, or other uncoded, non-script behavior. Even
the prosody and timing of the oral joke performance remain outside its purview
at present” (Norrick, 2003, p.1336).
2. An investigation of the cartoons by
Piyale Madra
The cartoons that had
appeared on the newspaper ‘Radikal’ are selected for a closer scrutiny.
Cartoon 1. 10/01/2001.
To analyze Cartoon 1,
first of all we should check whether it is funny for the patient (the boy) or
the bystanders (the readers of the cartoon, i.e. us). It might be funny for the
patient but it seems to be accidental for the general humorosity of Cartoon 1.
It is the bystander humorosity which is central to Cartoon 1. Following SSTH,
let’s examine whether there are at least two scripts internally compatible but
externally in clash. The script of mother-as-an-adult and the script of
mother-as-a-young-woman-in-mentality are internally consistent but externally
in clash. A register shift where the mother accommodates her speech by use of
youngster lexicality (e.g. ‘moruk’) invokes the opposition between the two.
From a Gricean framework,
the mother seems to flout the maxim of quality. She uses a language that is
inadmissible for her age group. But this remains as a speculation with this
limited amount of information. Maybe she has really adopted youngster’s view of
life after the suggestion by her friend. In that case, the mother does not
violate the maxim of quality. On the other hand, the former is the more likely
alternative and the humorosity accrues from the incongruity based on flouting
the maxim of quality. Therefore, in this cartoon, flouting a maxim leads to
humorosity.
Probably, flouting other
maxims or a combination of them leads to humorosity too. In a movie, the
character who wants to be a movie star is at home after his first set and he
starts to ‘speak’ with his friend. His friend has problems but the protagonist
starts to narrate his first experience regardless of what the hearer says. It
is a whole narration interrupted by the hearer’s short sentences about his
problem. The hearer is depressed and feels that nobody minds him and the speaker’s
narration confirms his depressive ideas. This is tragical as well as humorous.
The dialogue in that movie does not seem to be cooperative but interestingly it
seems to be phatic. Only intimate friends can continue their dialogue with
their own agendas and relevancies. The hearer’s relevancy is completely
different from the speaker’s relevancy but they can still pursue the dialogue
for some time.
Flouting the maxim of
relation (relevance) may also be humorous when a patient with formal thought
disorder is either hearer or speaker. The relevance for such patients is not
semantical relevancy but a phonological relevancy. The transition points in
their narration are based on sounds most of the time. Suppose that they are
asked their ‘name’. Their answer will probably
revolve on the words ‘game’, ‘same’, ‘fame’ and other phonologically
pertinent words (Chaika, 2000, p. 120; Kuperberg, McGuire, & David, 2000;
Langdon et al., 2002).
Flouting the maxim of quantity seems not to generate humorosity. It often
leads to distress. That is why a cartoon in which the maxim of quantity is
flouted would not make any sense.
Finally, flouting the
maxim of manner would obviously lead to humorosity as observed in following
cartoons.
Cartoon 2. 10/03/2001.
In Cartoon 2, the script
of my-wife-as-my-mother is violated and then restored. This is the butt of the
humorosity of Cartoon 2. But there is a hint here: if we consider the woman as
the man’s wife, this is clearly a presupposition. There is no explicature that
points out that she is his wife. Maybe she is his aunt or sister. Also, maybe
they are not married. But we infer that they are wife and husband since this
may be a prototypical situation in some of the marriages. It should be reminded
that the humorosity of Cartoon 2 comes from the bystanders again. For the agent
and patient of the Cartoon 2, the event is not funny. It is probably their
ordinary talk.
Cartoon 2 flouts the maxim of quality in the way Cartoon 1 does. The last
frame confers that he does not believe in his statements and does not act in
accordance with them.
Cartoon 3. 10/05/2001.
Cartoon 3 is an
illustration of therapeutic talk. The counselee performs a face threatening
act. This is not humorous by itself. The humorosity comes from the counselor’s
response as well as his act of hitting on the table by his fist –which is a
ritual accompanying the utterance of “God forbid” in Turkish culture. The
counselor too performs a face threatening act. He has violated the felicity
condition as well as the counselor-as-the soother script.
Cartoon 4. 11/06/2001.
In Cartoon 4, the
punchline concerns an implicature. The father’s response implies that he would
not buy a computer for his son. But he states it indirectly in order not to
lose face and engage in an argument that would probably end up with crying of
the son. The scripts in clash correspond to the be-realistic maxim and
remove-unrealistic-moves-from-your-set-of-action maxim.
Cartoon 5. 12/07/2001.
In Cartoon 5, the punch line has the implicature that the man is reluctant
to marry with the woman regardless of their intimacy. Thus he tries to shift
the topic of the dialogue to an astronomical one. An alternative explanation
would be that the punch line may be a case of metaphor where the flight of a
shooting star resembles marriage and the provided definition renders marriage
to a burning meteor. In both of the interpretations, the scripts in opposition
are same. The frames invoke the script of a-romantic-time-most-appropriate-to-talk-about-marriage
script while the man provides the script of better-without-marriage. The facial
expressions of the man in the first three frames implies that he would fit into
the first script whereas the fourth frame initiates the stage of incongruity
just to move on to the stage of resolution in the last frame.
Cartoon 6. 10/09/2001.
In Cartoon 6, two marriage scripts are in clash.
Ideal-marriage-in-a-child-play is pursued up until the last frame. The
incongruity and resolution stages are merged in the last frame. The implicature
of the mother’s utterance is probably that they do not enjoy such an ideal
marriage nowadays, but they used to enjoy it in the first days of their
marriage. The experiential aspect may be important in processing Cartoon 6. A
reader with serious marriage problems would be unmoved by the punch line or be
oversensitive to the butt of the cartoon. Alternatively, the experiential state
might influence the volitional aspect. The reader might comprehend the punch
line but refuse to laugh. Same holds for the fifth cartoon.
Cartoon 7. 12/09/2001.
In Cartoon 7, the script of I-want-to-go-far-ahead-soon is offered in the
first two frames. The third frame corresponds to the incongruity stage. The
last frame settles down the issue. The person wants to go but is hesitant to
leave his mother and maybe his family in general. Implicatures and presuppositions
are involved in the last frame. But now again, it is not only an agent-patient
implicature, but a partially bystander implicature. We as readers are engaged
in the implicature as well as the patient of the cartoon. The musical note
implies that the mother’s utterance has a certain intonation reminiscent of
those encountered in our lives.
Cartoon 8. 11/10/2001.
In Cartoon 8, the first three frames correspond to the stage of setup. The
script of intellectuals-as-wiseacres is invoked and the curiosity lies in the
expected response from the intellectuals. The final frame indicates that the
woman’s ideas are verified. Thus this is an interesting cartoon. It does not
switch the initial frame but restitutes it and the essence of humorosity
accrues from this restitution.
Cartoon 9. 12/11/2001.
In Cartoon 9, the utterances by the ‘artist’ tap the script of I-produced-popular-works-due-to-economic-reasons-but-now-I-am-economically-OK.
The implication of this script by default is that since the ‘artist’ has not
lost his essence of making good art and did the kitsch work due to external
reasons and he has no economical problems now, he would make good art. The
second script is
I-produced-popular-works-and-this-process-transformed-me-to-be-a-kitsch-artist
which seems to be less likely. But the last frame points out that the less
likely alternative wins. That is why the cartoon is humorous. If the cartoon
would have ended up with the more likely script, it would not have been
humorous.
Cartoon 10. 09/14/2001
In Cartoon 10, the agent woman has a script of sexual life which is in
clash with that of the patient woman. But we as readers and the agent woman are
not aware that the patient woman has a different script of sexual life. The
first woman is promiscuous while the second woman is not. The stages of
incongruity and resolution are merged in the final frame.
Cartoon 11. 12/14/2001.
In Cartoon 11, the initial script is introduced very lately –in the fifth
frame. The first four frames can be considered to be presequences. Again the
stages of incongruity and resolution are merged in the final frame. Indeed the
facial expression of the first girl in the fifth frame hints that a second
script is evoked. The first girl interprets the second girl’s proposed letter
as a sign that the second girl knows the first girl’s boyfriend and maybe had
fallen in love with the boy. This interpretation is generated by the bystander
implicatures of the final utterance.
Cartoon 12. 10/15/2001.
In Cartoon 12, the first two frames are presequences for the third and the
last frames. The utterance in the third frame has another implicature other
than the didactic one which is captured by the second man in the last frame.
The same content and implicature ambiguity will be observed in Cartoon 17.
Cartoon 13. 11/15/2001.
In Cartoon 13, the setting is an alcohol scene and the expectation is that
one of the men should have some problems, and alcohol talk functions as the
major cathartic channel. But the initial script is a no-problem one. Thus
without the last frame, the three frames are incongruent with the alcoholic setting.
The last frame is anticipated. In brief, no-problem and problem scripts are in
opposition in Cartoon 13.
Cartoon 14. 11/16/2001.
In Cartoon 14, the first three frames are presequences for the fourth
frame. They correspond to the stage of setup. The posture of the first man
throughout the cartoon signals that he is a sober-minded person. Thus the
default script is me-the-sober-minded-man. However when the content of his
utterance is considered, his explosion seems to be imminent. That is why the
second man wants to leave him as soon as possible. The last utterance implies
that the second man got the message.
From a non-verbal communication view, Cartoon 14 is interesting because the
opposition is due to the clash of the script invoked by the man’s nonverbal
features especially posture vs. the verbal content. The second man prefers to
take the verbal script as his guide though it is always the reverse in everyday
life (Argyle, 1988, pp.91-92; Feyereisen, & de Lannoy, 1991; pp.66-67).
From a Gricean point of view, the second man thinks that the first man does
not flout the maxim of quality. That is why he leaves the room.
Cartoon 15. 09/17/2001.
Cartoon 15 starts with an NBF mode. A nonliteral use of the ownership (of
the nature) is employed. But at the end, the woman shifts NBF mode to BF. The
humorosity accordingly accrues from the clash of the modes of NBF and BF.
Cartoon 16. 10/23/2001.
In Cartoon 16, the man uses a highly ornate language upon the marriage
proposal. For the first five frames, the readers get the impression that the
floridity of his language is a general phenomenon. Thus the initial script is
the-floridity-of-the-man’s-language-is-generic. The alternative script is
the-floridity-of-the-man’s-language-is-due-to-the-register which is less likely
to happen. The final frame corresponds to the stage of resolution.
The interpretation of Cartoon 16 necessitates a revision in Gricean
framework. The man flouts the maxim of quality and the maxim of manner. He
flouts the latter since he is not brief and orderly in his proposal while he
flouts the former since he uses a language which he does not use in general.
This may be interpreted as a sublanguage shift rather than a flouting of the
maxim of quality. Nevertheless the idea that it concerns a sublanguage shift
will be a challenge again for Gricean framework on the grounds that that
framework considers language as a homogeneous entity lacking sublinguistic
components. Ottoman Turkish as well as the pure Turkish vocabulary are used for
purposes of humorosity in everyday conversations in Turkish culture. This use
of Ottoman Turkish and pure Turkish vocabulary can be merged in cartoons to
generate extremely humorous cartoons accompanied by clothes or even uniforms
and gowns that are incongruent with the (sub)language used. One example for
manipulation of the Ottoman Turkish in cartoons is the cartoon by Günbilen
entitled Hokoz in ‘Birgün’ newspaper. The title of the band is always
accompanied by the date in the old calendar.
Another linguistic shift in Turkish language concerns the Turkic languages.
After the demise of the Soviet Union, a cultural bridge has been constructed
between Turkey and Turkic states and the cultural exchange has prevailed. The
TV programs of Turkic states (especially Azeris since Azeri language is the
most comprehensible to the ears of Turkey) have become a continuous source of
fun and enjoyment. The presequence patterns of Turkic languages became one of
the most preferred joke components for the people of Turkey. For example,
Azeri’s greeting ‘helallik’ (hello) when heard from Brad Pitt in a movie
broadcasted on the Azeri channel has not been laughed for less than a year in
many occasions. The humorosity based on the manipulation of Turkic languages in
that way seems not to be explained by Gricean framework but can be considered
to be meta-deixes and explained by a resort to the distinction between bona
fide and non-bona fide modes pronounced before.
Cartoon 17. 09/24/2001.
Cartoon 17 resembles Cartoon 12 in terms of the scripts and the opposition
employed for the sake of humorosity. The first three frames invoke the
script-of-life-goes-on and that of
you-are-unimportant-in-the-complexity-of-life. But it seems that there is no
resolution in Cartoon 17. One of the opposing scripts is not favored over
another. Both of the scripts are still active. The resolution would have been
observed in the next frame which is intentionally not included. The humorosity
in this cartoon is neither an agent nor a patient humorosity. That is why it is
interesting.
From a psychotherapeutic
point of view, the boy’s responses combined with the non-verbal signals are
disturbing since they sound to be general responses to any utterances. He does
not consider the peculiarities of the girl’s problems.
Cartoon 18. 09/25/2001.
Cartoon 18 resembles Cartoon 3. A face threatening act is involved in the
fifth frame. From the very beginning, the theme of
death-is-a-natural-occurrence leads to two plausible scripts: Death-is-a-natural-occurrence-for-people
vs. death-is-a-natural-occurrence-for-people-except-me. The latter cannot be
anticipated up until its introduction in the last frame. The humorosity of this
cartoon comes right from this unexpectedness.
Cartoon 19. 09/28/2001.
It seems that SIR theory can not provide a reasonable account for the
humorosity of Cartoon 19. It seems to be a case of inference rather than
implicature or presupposition.
Besides that, from a speech act perspective, the utterances in the cartoon
as a whole constitute a directive in the Searlean sense. But these utterances
as a whole are not direct. Thus they should be called as ‘indirect directives’.
Another point is that they are unintentional as the facial expressions of the
first couple in the last frame confer. Since the speakers and hearers of the
Searlean universe are intentional agents under the idea of shared
intentionality (Dascal, 1992, p.52; Holdcroft, 1992, p.63; Jucker, 1992,
pp.88-89; Roulet, 1992, p.93), it is hard to interpret Cartoon 19 by staying
within the boundaries of that universe. Other cases in which decoding is
unintentional may pose other threats for Searlean understanding of speech acts.
It should be added that Gricean framework is not immune to such problems
(Jaszczolt, 2002, p.831).
Searle’s claim further extends the postulation that the speakers and the
hearers are intentional in conversation. He claims that “they [conversations] involve shared intentionality. Conversations are a
paradigm of collective behavior” (Searle, 1992, p.21). Such a position is
doomed to failure upon considering the cases such as Cartoon 19.
3.Conclusion
In the sample of cartoons as well as other cartoons, one of the most
striking observations for theoretical reasons is the minimal use of deictic
expressions and anaphoras that has a great potential to ambiguate the
utterances. This observation seems to refute the theory that proposes that the
humorosity of a text or even a single sentence is due to vagueness. A
distinction between ambivalence and vagueness should be introduced. The
cartoons are not vague but they hold more than one meaning. Thus the humorosity
is due to ambivalence in the sense of having multiple values as in the
etymological roots of the word rather than vagueness.
Although this alternative proposal is the most reasonable at first blush,
it is untenable. This proposal ignores the existence of implicatures and that
every sentence can have implied meanings depending on the context. If the idea
that “every sentence can have implied meanings depending on the context” is true,
every sentence must be humor-prone depending on the context. Such a position
needs further meditations.
Furthermore, such a position would have reverberations for understanding
the nonliteral language use. Berrendonner (1981) claims that all sentences are
irony-prone contrary to the idea that factual statements are less irony-prone.
He contrasts the sentences below and concludes that though the former seems to
be less irony-prone at first blush, it is possible to imagine a situation in
which it is used ironically and other examples conferring the possibility of
ironical use of the sentence easily come to mind.
(1)
Je vais rentrer la voiture
(2)
C’est malin (Berrendonner, 1981, pp. 182-183).
Other possibilities are as follows:
1) Performatives maybe more humor-prone as compared to nonperformatives.
2) There may be discourse markers of contrast signaling the incongruity
phase and in the case of cartoons these markers may be communicated by
nonlinguistic ways –i.e. by visual contrasting. One example for visual
contrasting maybe a mother with teenager clothes rather than adopting the
youngster jargon as exemplified in Cartoon 1.
3) Some of the speech acts such as declaratives may be more humor-prone.
4) Violation of the maxims can be a necessary but not sufficient condition
for humorosity.
5) Each cartoon can be an illocution. That is because, each and every
cartoon is a declaration just like “I declare that this is a cartoon”. The
cartoon has respective perlocutions directed towards the readers.
References
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humour:
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International Universities Press, Inc.
Attardo, S. (2003). Introduction: the pragmatics of humor. Journal of
Pragmatics, 35, 1287-1294.
Berrendonner, A. (1981). Éléments de pragmatique linguistique.
Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit.
Chaika, E. (2000). Linguistics, pragmatics and psychotherapy: a guide
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Dascal, M. (1992). Conversation: structure or process. In J. R. Searle et
al. (On) Searle on conversation (pp. 35-56). Amsterdam/Philadelphia:
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Feyereisen, P., & de Lannoy, J.-D. (1991). Gestures and speech:
psychological investigations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Holdcroft, D. (1992). Conversation and structure. In J. R. Searle et al. (On)
Searle on conversation (pp. 57-76). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins
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Jaszczolt, K. M. (2002). Against ambiguity and underspecification: evidence
from presupposition as anaphora. Journal of Pragmatics, 34, 829-849.
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al. (On) Searle on conversation (pp. 77-90). Amsterdam/Philadelphia:
John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Kuperberg, G. R., McGuire, P. K., & David, A. S. (2000). Sensitivity to
linguistic anomalies in spoken sentences: a case study approach to understanding
thought disorder in schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 30,
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Norrick, N. R. (2003). Issues in conversational joking. Journal of
Pragmatics, 35, 1333-1359.
Raskin, V. (1998). The sense of humor and the truth. In W. Ruch (Ed.). The
sense of humor: explorations of a personality characteristics (pp. 95-108).
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Ritchie, G. (2001). Current directions in computational humour. Artificial
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conversation (pp. 91-99). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing
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on conversation (pp. 7-29). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins
Publishing Company.
Vaid, J., Hull, R., Heredia, R., Gerkens, D., Martinez, F. (2003). Getting
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Source: Gezgin, U. B. (2017). Cognition and Art: Essays on Cognitive Science and Art Narratives.
COGNITION AND ART: ESSAYS ON COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND ART NARRATIVES
Prof.Dr. Ulaş Başar Gezgin
COGNITIVE SCIENCE
1. The Embodied Cognition View
2. On Flanagan’s Ideas On Dreams and Ahead: An Attempt To Locate Dreaming Phenomenon Under The Superclass Of Consciousness
3. “The Pragmatics of Cartoons: The Interaction of Bystander Humorosity vs. Agent-Patient Humorosity.”
4. Integrationist School or on ‘Rethinking Language’.
5. On Steven Pinker’s ‘Language Instinct’ or Some Remarks on Evolutionary Psycholinguistics
6. On the (Im)Possibility of Psychotherapist Computer Programs: An Investigation within the Realm of Epistemology
7. Thai Language: A Brief Typology.
ART NARRATIVES
8. Armenians As Ingroups in William Saroyan’s Stories from the Framework of the Theory of Social Representations: A Social Psychological Inquiry.
9. A Critique of The Stories By South East Asian Writing Awardees
10. Mulholland Drive: Another impasse for the American film industry.
11. On 'About Schmidt'
12. On Black spirituals.
13. The possibility of an African American poetry.
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